Russia's soft and sharp power in southeast Europe — the Russian hybrid influence operation in Montenegro

This is a chapter published in a conference publication that was written within the framework of the project “Reality Check Series: Sources, Tools, and Impact of External Non-EU-Engagement in Southeast Europe.” The project was led by the Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft (SOG) with the support of the German Federal Foreign Office (Stability Pact for Southeast Europe sponsored by Germany).Whether its role is described as spoiler or opportunist, the Kremlin strategy in the Balkans is to drag its rivals’ involvement down to a level that would make countries of the region subjects to Moscow’s interference. Not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures, burdened with endemic corruption, suffering from a democratic deficit, ethnic tensions, and protracted bilateral disputes, the Western Balkans’ countries are an ideal target for Russia. Preventive operations often seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance. The coup attempt in Montenegro, in October 2016, is a good example of the Russian hybrid influence operations in the Balkans. The goal of Moscow was to prevent NATO membership of the country. To prove it, this work focuses on Moscow’s attempts to influence Montenegro prior to the coup attempt.The paper argues that the coup plot in Montenegro is the culmination of more than a two-years long hybrid influence operation. This includes a) Russian attempts to influence Montenegro through economic means; b) Moscow’s effort to establish a lasting naval (military) presence in Montenegro; c) The intensive media campaign; d) Deepening Russia’s influence on pro-Russian Serbian nationalists in Montenegro and open political and financial support for their activities. When overt means of influence appear to have been inefficient, a covert operation looks like a viable option. That’s what happened in Montenegro.Accepted manuscrip

The orthodox church, montenegro, and the ‘serbian world’

While politics is transient, for Serbs in the Western Balkans the church is a constant - a stable entity and an institution that represents historical continuity, national identity and destiny. The church casts itself as the authentic articulator of the soul of the Serbs and throughout the Western Balkans many of them regard it as an institution that is beyond reproach.2 Consequently The SPC is more influential and powerful than any individual political figure or any state institution in Serbia or in the neighboring states where Serbs reside.Accepted manuscrip

Exploring private sector contributions to sustainable development among EU and aspiring EU member Nations of South-Eastern Europe

The brief offers a thorough overview (with comments) of the conference titled: Exploring Private Sector Contributions to Sustainable Development Among EU and Aspiring EU Member Nations of South-Eastern Europe.Published versio

The European Union dilemma: Russia’s and China’s increasing influence in the Western Balkans (case study: Serbia and Montenegro)

This paper discusses the growing influence and transformative power of Beijing and Moscow in the Western Balkans (WB), particularly as regards Serbia and Montenegro, and its implications for the European Union (EU). It draws upon both primary and secondary sources and narratives currently dominating public discourse in Serbia and Montenegro. The paper focuses on the main tools – economic, political, and cultural – which Russia and China use to establish themselves as viable and/or even preferable alternatives to the EU.Published versio

Small states in the region: from intuitive towards smart diplomacy

Small states, including those in the region of Southeast Europe, can successfully collaborate with complex systems such as the EU or the OSCE. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania were/are non-permanent members of the UN Security Council. Montenegro’s diplomatic achievements since its independence have exceeded expectations, yet their success is often the result of intuitive rather than well-planned diplomatic activities. Multilateralism opens avenues for small states in the global arena, which in order to play a relatively significant role, must develop “clever” diplomacy distinct from either “big” diplomacy with heavy infrastructure, or “small” diplomacy, which may not have much of infrastructure at all.Published versio

Imagining Yugoslavia – a social construct or/and an idea with the purpose

Given its length and other similar works in this field, this essay has rather limited ambition. It focuses on a particular argument often used in the nationalistic narrative – the argument that Yugoslavia was an artificial state. The work primarily discusses how the Yugoslav idea was born and argues that the process of “imagining Yugoslavia” captured the zeitgeist of the late 18th and 19th century when modern European nations were born. The Yugoslav idea was a reflection of the epoch of national awakening. Yugoslavia was the embodiment of south Slavs’ dreams and interests to live in one country. It was a social construct much like every other state, and it constructed its identity, myths, and collective memory as every other state had done before. The paper argues that Yugoslavia had difficulty maintaining “mass support” because it was a civic nation organized as a multinational state. Its major challenge throughout its short existence was to keep “national and political unity” in congruence, which is, according to Ernest Gellner, a precondition for a nation to exist.Published versio